by George Voskopoulos*
The European integration process constitutes a Herculean task and has been operationalized on two pillars: the strategy of integration and the strategy of cooperation.
All these years the EU has managed to survive several crises that have shown the way forward towards integration. However, the current crisis does not concern only relations, views and divergent attitudes among European political elites. Above all, it results from a clear divergence on strategies between elites and peoples and the means to be used. The EU, as an endeavor for “an ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe” risks to be delegitimized in the eyes of its peoples.
The fiscal and debt crisis in the European Union has triggered a covert and at times overt twin debate as far as the sustainability of the austerity measures are concerned and the role of Germany in the EU. The two issues are multifaceted, overtly or covertly interconnected and have affected not only pan-European public opinion but also the re-orientation of the European institutional edifice.
The extent and intensity of the austerity measures taken in the south relate to choices that have no historical precedent, a politico-economic mixture that threatens the very foundation of a union of states created on the basis of equal partnership and legitimacy provided by European collectivities. Legitimacy is not an epiphenomenal or procedural issue but an essential process through which individuals and peoples directly or indirectly engage in choices formulation.
For decades, these choices have been made on an elite level; yet, the merits of common policies on the social and economic level outnumbered the nominal and constitutional democratic deficit. As a result, reactions were dramatically limited and took the form of ideological externalization of the euroskeptics’ bravado and their rejection of an integrated Europe. Today the financial crisis questions the very essence of the European integration process, the legitimacy pillars of the conscious and rational transferring of power to non-national institutions. Non-sustainable austerity and the adoption of neo-liberal policies have caused the transformation of the social landscape across Europe and triggered an uncontrollable restructuring of the social stratification process. They have also resulted in dramatic changes in the perception of European citizens vis-à-vis the EU and its ability to provide a democratic, politically accountable and legitimate alternative to the nation-state.
Defining multilevel interaction among member states
Managerial or merely technocratic choices cannot be disconnected by the ability of Germany to streamline and successfully support policies that fall within the country’s perception of the European institutional basis and its operational mode. The multilevel interaction among member states is gradually but steadily defined in terms of economic power, and this constitutes a post-modern element of intra-European relations, an effort to impose what I have recently defined as institutional hegemonism. In effect economic, not military power, seem to define intra-European relations.
The creation of European institutions meant to establish the institutional means to absorb inter-European heterogeneity and thus provide a pillar of materializing two aims: First, to eliminate war in the old continent; and second, to prevent the establishment of a hegemonic structure on the part of any European power. Historically, this refers to the “German problem” in Europe and the ability of European states to efficiently manage the inherent power of Germany. European integration has always focused on the need to deal with the German issue, while the unification of Germany originally set the dilemma of establishing a European Germany or a German Europe.
National states made the choice of transferring power to supranational institutions that nominally secured equal status in a union of states that disposed different abilities and potential. In effect this allowed smaller states to have a decisive role in the integration process and successfully defend national interests. European nationalisms did not disappear but transformed themselves and adapted to the new pan-European governance model. In this way they became manageable and did not lead to zero-sum games.
Yet, the current trends for institutional changes are threatening the intra-European balance within the EU institutions. During the early years of European integration the issue at stake was the level of inter-institution rivalry and cooperation. This allowed ample space for academic and technocratic approaches to a number of issues concerning institutionalization. At a later stage the public debate on Europe focused on the need to efficiently manage institutions to avoid the creation of an amorphous, de-legitimized technocratic apparatus isolated from European collectivities. Today the debate centers on the inability of EU institutions to operate independently and withstand pressure to take the form that allows economically powerful actors to advance unilateral gains.
German economic bravado and multifaceted power allow Berlin to push for institutional changes that serve primarily its national interests. The adoption of the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (“fiscal compact”) is the result of German efforts to profit from its economic advantageous position within the EU. If over-indebted countries lose their equal status within the EU, then the union will operate on a zero-sum game framework. What is most striking is that this will take place in a procedurally legitimate way that will allow Berlin to impose its monolithic view of Europe. In the past it was the short-sighted view of a Christian-only Europe. Today it is the view of a union that intervenes in the national organizational structures (Demos), overlays the domestic Leviathan and imposes austerity, budgetary control and constitutional changes.
The attitude of European partners vis-à-vis German policies and dictates has been a policy of appeasement. They gave in to German pressure and as a result the national political systems have been under pressure on the domestic level. This has caused political instability in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Ireland. Operationally, constitutionally and cognitively national political elites have been de-legitimized under the impact of their accepting a German policy of asymmetric, non-sustainable austerity that eventually facilitated the re-surfacing of ultra-nationalist parties across Europe.
Today the EU is at a crossroads, forced to make hard choices on the political, institutional, financial and social levels. The adopted policies have caused the alienation of European collectivities from their leaderships and triggered social unrest and political instability. For the EU, losing its legitimacy is a question of time, unless European leaders decide to go back to the roots of 60 years of successful integration and adopt policies that put citizens first and deal with German economic nationalism. In any other case, European institutions and their evolution will only serve German national interests and economic intrusion in the weakest EU members.
*Dr. George Voskopoulos, assistant professor of European Studies, Department of International and European Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. (gvoskop@uom.gr)
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